Rail Passengers Statement on Proposed Amtrak Restructuring

For Immediate Release (26-02)
February 20, 2026
Contact: Joe Aiello ([email protected])

Rail Passengers Association Issues Statement on Reports of a Potential Organizational Restructuring of Amtrak

Washington, D.C. -- The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has revealed that it is directing Amtrak to undertake a dramatic organizational restructuring, breaking itself into three distinct operational entities within an umbrella holding company, focusing on operations, rolling stock management and leasing, and infrastructure management and construction. The FRA teased the restructuring at an event held by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials Council on Rail Transportation last week. Additionally, Bloomberg covered expressions of concern from a leading labor organization that the potential restructuring could lead to the eventual privatization of Amtrak’s operations.

Rail Passengers has received an initial briefing on the proposed restructuring from FRA officials, with more in depth briefings scheduled. The outline of the proposal, which will presumably be fleshed out through a public process over the coming months, involves the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (NRPC), currently doing business as Amtrak, acting as a holding company for three distinct and separate subsidiaries: an infrastructure management entity, a rolling stock management entity, and an operational entity.

Jim Mathews, President & CEO of Rail Passengers, issued the following statement in light of early reports on the potential restructuring:

When done correctly, there are potential benefits to a structural reorganization. However, the experiences of European and Asian railways tell us there are clear and present dangers to this kind of restructuring. If done incorrectly, it can lead to service reductions, elimination of routes, increased fares for passengers, and even degradations in infrastructure and safety.

Critically, in the absence of predictable and sufficient public funding, this restructuring is certain to fail. To the extent that this is an attempt to reduce public investment in the national passenger rail system, it will have predictable results: privatization of profits, socialization of losses, deferred investment in infrastructure, and the degradation of frequencies and service quality -- particularly for routes that serve rural and small town America.

Additionally, there must be buy-in from the U.S. Congress and States; any restructuring that isn’t done in conjunction with the Congressional debate over the shape of the surface transportation reauthorization and state-level network planning will be DOA.

Rail Passengers stands ready to be an active participant in the conversation over how, or if, this restructuring should take place.

In the absence of firm details, rail industry stakeholders are struggling to determine the downstream effects. Bloomberg reported that the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET issued a memo to its members sounding alarm over the potential consequences of a restructuring of labor agreements for the roughly 18,000 unionized Amtrak workers.

“Shifts of this nature raise legitimate and substantive concerns regarding the maintenance of qualifications, preservation of established work jurisdiction, crew utilization practices, pilot requirements, and, most importantly, the continued protection and enforcement of existing Agreement rights,” wrote Patrick Darcy, chair of the Amtrak General Committee of Adjustment for the BLET.

For its part, the U.S. Department of Transportation denies that the move is part of a privatization scheme -- though it has yet to release a detailed proposal.

“The Trump Administration is considering ways to strengthen and modernize Amtrak for the future, but privatization is not under consideration,” Danna Almeida, a spokesperson for the Department of Transportation, told Bloomberg in response to inquiries.

An Overview of the Rail Passengers’ Understanding of the USDOT Restructuring Proposal

National Railroad Passenger Corporation

The NRPC will act as a holding company.

Infrastructure Management Entity (IME)

The IME would take over management of all Amtrak-owned infrastructure assets -- most of which is centered along the Northeast Corridor (NEC) -- including dispatching infrastructure, maintenance of way, and capital delivery work.

The IME would also take on the infrastructure Amtrak currently manages on behalf of State partners (including both long term station leases and state-owned stations).

Rolling Stock Management Entity (RSME)

The RSME Rolling would manage all rolling stock owned by Amtrak, as well the maintenance facilities, back shops, and other parts of the equipment maintenance infrastructure. The proposal would allow state governments to include State-owned equipment in the RSME equipment pool on an opt-in basis.

The proposal mirrors what Rail Passengers had outlined in the National Equipment Leasing Pool Corporation included in our surface transportation reauthorization blueprint. A national equipment leasing pool, properly financed, would:

• Provides a mechanism for Amtrak-as-operator, State and local governments, and private sector operators to quickly and flexibly expand the number of trains they operate – both via additional frequencies and with new services;
• Leverage economies of scale through joint and pooled procurement; and
• Keep costs low by limiting opportunities for customization, change orders, and other considerations, including political/partisan interest.

Operational Entity (OE)

As envisioned, the OE would continue to reflect Amtrak’s current divisional structure: NEC, State-Supported, and Long Distance Routes -- with the potential to operate more regional rail service in the future.

This subsidiary raises the most questions. Given the current federal and state-level funding structure, it’s difficult to see how this introduces more, rather than less, operational stability. Cross-subsidization of operational subsidies for LDR and State-Supported routes with infrastructure subsidies for NEC capital investment has been a core component of the grand political bargain between rural and metropolitan politicians, and has been a key element to keeping Amtrak going in difficult funding environments. Creating an incentive structure wherein the operations arm becomes the main profit center for the other two subsidiaries -- through equipment and maintenance contracts for the RSME and access fees for the IME -- could very well lead to negative outcomes for service levels and on-board service quality.

Rail Passengers’ Metrics for Success for Any Restructuring

--Continued Oversight of NRPC “Holding Company”

Any reorganization must explicitly acknowledge clear and continuing congressional authority over the NRPC holding company and its subsidiaries.

A restructured Amtrak must remain accountable to the public, via their elected officials, the U.S. Department of Transportation, and the Government Accountability Office.

Board members must continue to be nominated by the President and seated with the “advice and consent of the Senate.”

--Continuity of Amtrak-Unique Legal Authorities

The OE, IME, and RSME must fully and unambiguously inherit Amtrak’s existing statutory authorities. That includes right of access on Class I railroad infrastructure, preferential dispatching, and condemnation powers.

Restructuring shouldn’t weaken NRPC’s legal standing or ability -- or the standing of any of its subsidiaries -- to operate effectively over host railroads and carry out functions critical to maintaining a functional rail network.

--Effective Mediation of the Relationship Between Subsidiaries

In many countries that have restructured their railways, an adversarial relationship has developed between the central track authorities and the train-operating companies, leading to inefficiencies and stagnation in the development of the rail network.

Any restructuring should explicitly place fulfillment of a common mission as the governing principle for the relationship between the subsidiaries, not profitseeking.

--Explicit Rejection of Profitability as a System-Wide Goal

Governance and performance frameworks should make clear that success should be measured by service quality, network connectivity, public benefit, and efficient stewardship of public funds -- not system-wide profitability.

We don’t expect highways to make a profit. Instead, the primary objective should be for services, construction projects, and rolling stock to be delivered quickly, on-time, and on-budget.

--Separation of Cost Transparency From Service Justification

Improved cost transparency resulting from restructuring should inform funding and investment decisions. However, cost allocation must not be used as a standalone justification for service reductions absent broader public-interest and mobility considerations.

The success of any given route should include a clear-eyed accounting of tax-base growth, community investment, second- and third-order workforce effects, and the many other benefits identified in Rail Passengers economic analyses.

--Accelerated Route Development Timelines

This is an opportunity to explicitly reject and re-set the hyper-conservative timelines for launching new passenger rail services -- particularly as outlined in the FRA’s Amtrak Long-Distance Service Study, which outlines a 15-plus year process for introducing a single daily round trip on existing railroad infrastructure.

The streamlining of leadership decision-making and authorities under the new structure should materially reduce the time required to develop and launch new passenger rail routes, with a target of no more than six years from concept to service initiation.

It is reasonable to expect that, with a supporting framework provided by Congress through a surface transportation reauthorization, at least two routes could be successfully launched under the revised framework within six years -- one Corridor ID candidate and one of the FRA Long-Distance Study preferred routes.

--No Net Reduction in National-Network Frequencies

Throughout the transition period, and perhaps for at least a decade beyond it, a restructured NRPC should be prohibited from reducing frequencies on the national passenger rail network, preventing service degradation through schedule thinning or indirect cuts. When new routes are established and launched, some frequency adjustments might be possible. However, net-net, the system should be running more trains, not fewer.

--Formal Governance Input for States and Passenger Interests

The OE should include a formalized governance or advisory mechanism -- potentially building on existing models such as SAIPRC -- to ensure structured input from state partners and national passenger advocates into operational planning and service delivery decisions.

--Functioning Rolling-Stock Acquisition and Leasing Entity

A successful reorganization must produce a nimble, professional rolling-stock acquisition and leasing arm capable of supplying Amtrak and state partners, as well as potentially other operators, while incorporating legal and financial guardrails that prevent moral hazard in equipment specification, procurement, and lifecycle cost management.

--Delivery of New Passenger Rail Equipment by 2030

By 2030, the reorganization should result in new passenger rail equipment that has been fully specified, procured, manufactured, and placed into service, demonstrating that the new structure can translate planning and funding into tangible, on-the-ground improvements.

Review of International Experiences With Similar Proposals

Asset restructuring of railways in other countries has tended to incorporate three major options: geographical division, vertical separation, and functional distinction.

British Rail Privatization (and Re-Nationalization)

The United Kingdom privatized its national passenger rail system in the mid‑1990s, breaking up the former British Rail into over two dozen private operating companies and a separately owned infrastructure manager, Railtrack.

The reform aimed to increase efficiency, stimulate innovation, and attract private investment. Instead, the system soon became known for fragmentation, rising costs, and recurring reliability issues.

A core problem was the division of responsibility: train operators owned no track, stations, or rolling stock, making coordination difficult and often adversarial. Railtrack, pressured to cut costs, struggled with maintenance and oversight, culminating in several major accidents—most notably the 2000 Hatfield derailment—linked to infrastructure failures. This crisis led to Railtrack’s collapse and replacement by the not‑for‑profit Network Rail, effectively re‑nationalizing the infrastructure.

Meanwhile, passenger fares increased faster than inflation, and punctuality remained inconsistent. Franchise competitions often failed, with operators withdrawing early or requiring government bailouts, such as the East Coast Main Line franchise, which returned to public control multiple times.

Despite periods of growth in ridership, structural complexity, financial instability, and repeated government intervention have continued to challenge the privatized model, prompting ongoing debate about whether fuller public ownership would deliver better outcomes.

In December of 2024, the UK government launched a rail public ownership program and announced the first services to transfer into public ownership.

In November of 2025, the Railways Bill was introduced in the UK Parliament to authorize the creation of the Great British Railways (GBR), a publicly owned entity charged with overseeing the entire rail network.

Japanese National Railway Settlement Corporation

Japan privatized the state‑owned Japanese National Railways (JNR) in 1987, breaking it into six regional passenger companies and one freight company, collectively known as the JR Group. The reform aimed to address JNR’s massive debt (by 1987, JNR had accrued a total long-term liability of 37.2 trillion Yen, or roughly $256 billion in 1987 USD), chronic inefficiencies, and declining public trust.

Privatization delivered several clear benefits. The new JR companies gained managerial autonomy, enabling more efficient operations, reduced staffing levels, and modernization of services. Financial performance improved significantly on major intercity and urban corridors, and three of the passenger companies—JR East, JR Central, and JR West—eventually became fully private, publicly traded firms. Investment in technology accelerated, including the expansion of high‑speed Shinkansen lines, improved safety systems, and customer‑service innovations. Passenger satisfaction and punctuality remained among the highest in the world.

However, the restructuring came with costs. The breakup required the government to absorb a substantial portion of JNR’s long‑term debt -- around 24 trillion Yen in 2009 (almost $200 billion in 2009 USD). Additionally, many rural lines continued to face chronic financial losses, and regional disparities widened, as profitable urban networks thrived while less profitable rural services faced reductions or closure.

Overall, Japan’s rail privatization is widely viewed as successful, though not without significant social and fiscal challenges.

Open Access: Italy, Spain and Sweden

The liberalization of national passenger rail systems in Italy, Spain, and Sweden reflected differing policy choices. However, we can identify some common outcomes across all three cases.

Italy pursued high‑speed rail (HSR) liberalization early, fostering competition between Trenitalia and Italo. This competition led to substantial benefits: average fares fell by roughly 30% between 2011 and 2016, and demand for high‑speed services grew significantly.

Spain implemented a more recent and intensive liberalization process. The opening of high‑speed corridors to operators such as Ouigo and Iryo produced major gains: ridership increased by 42% compared with 2019, adding nearly 4.8 million new passengers, and fares declined by an average of 33% (44% real). Competition triggered substantial modal shifts from road and air, yielding over €500 million in societal benefits and reduced emissions. Yet, despite infrastructure manager ADIF’s revenue gains, rail operators faced growing financial pressures, and concerns emerged about unequal competition and sustainability—especially as commuter and regional services prepare for similar neo-liberal reforms.

Sweden, the earliest adopter among the three, fully opened its passenger rail market in 2010. While open access brought competition on profitable routes, regional and local services continue to depend heavily on public subsidies. Critics argue that liberalization shifted public funds toward private operators without delivering commensurate improvements in service quality; rail’s modal share rose only marginally from 8.1% to 9% between 2008 and 2023. Persistent issues include inadequate capacity allocation, unequal access to rolling stock, and service fragmentation, which have limited the overall benefits of market opening.

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About the Rail Passengers Association: with 127,000 members, donors, and supporters, the non-profit Rail Passengers Association is the oldest and largest national organization serving as a voice for the more than 40 million rail passengers in the U.S. Our mission is to improve and expand conventional intercity and regional passenger train services, support higher speed rail initiatives, increase connectivity among all forms of transportation, and ensure safety for our country's trains and passengers. All of this makes communities safer, more accessible, and more productive, improving the lives of everyone who lives, works, and plays in towns all across America.