Superliner Replacements: Challenges And Solutions

By Rail Passengers Staff

Amtrak’s ambitious Long Distance Fleet Replacement (LDFR) program, poised to redefine its long-distance services, faces significant risks according to a report from Amtrak’s Office of Inspector General (OIG), but management has already addressed concerns about the number of car types and their complex designs, and expects to have responded to OIG’s remaining concerns by March.

Revised proposals from car builders are expected by the end of this month, which means that Amtrak faces pivotal decisions that will shape the future of its long-distance service for decades.

With an estimated cost of $7 billion for its first phase, the program aims to replace aging equipment across nine of its 15 long-distance routes. However, delays, unclear management structures, and complex design requirements pose critical challenges, OIG said, flagging unclear lines of management authority as a particular risk for the Superliner replacement effort.

The audit, issued December 13, highlights the inherent complexity of procuring new bilevel railcars with untested designs and features, such as onboard elevators for passengers with disabilities.

Amtrak executives recognized the challenges that emerged during the Request for Information and Request for Proposal stages. When car-builders told Amtrak that what they were asking to do was potentially too difficult to deliver on time and on budget, management reshaped the procurement process, adapted the RFP, and extended the deadline for car-builders to respond to the solicitation.

The idea was not only to reduce technical complexity, but to ensure that more car-builders felt able to compete for the business.

Although OIG faulted the program for that seven-month delay, we think putting the program on pause to take the car-builders’ concerns seriously is smart program management. To do otherwise, and push through without heeding industry’s warnings, would be much worse than absorbing a delay.

OIG itself acknowledged, in response to Amtrak’s comments on a draft of the report, that Amtrak’s revisions to its requirements were aimed at both reducing complexity and increasing “car-builders’ flexibility to propose solutions.” OIG said that “the company’s efforts to ensure that the revisions support robust competition and include industry feedback is a positive development.”

Among OIG’s key findings:
• Complex Design Requirements: Amtrak’s initial specifications for premium amenities added genuine complexity, leading to feedback from car builders that the requirements were infeasible. Amtrak responded by cutting back from nine car types to perhaps five or six, and by simplifying some of the design elements.
• Management Weaknesses: The OIG found that Amtrak's Capital Delivery department lacks contingency plans for high-impact risks and suffers from unclear lines of authority. Departures among some of the senior staff within the program have exacerbated decision-making delays.
• Broader Impacts: Additional delays or cost increases could strain Amtrak’s ability to maintain its legacy fleet and advance other infrastructure projects. The company has already spent $191 million from FY 2022–2024 to keep its aging fleet operational, and the longer it takes to field replacements the more money will have to be spent to keep the existing fleet in service.

Amtrak acknowledged the OIG’s findings, agreed with each of OIG’s recommendations, and outlined how it would address each in turn.

The revised RFP and requirements already addressed some of the major concerns in the report, and OIG said it wasn’t going to offer recommendations about the RFP as a result of Amtrak’s move to make changes. Amtrak pledged to refine decision-making structures and update program documentation to streamline how problems are surfaced and who has the authority to act. The company also promised to prioritize filling critical executive leadership roles in the fleet-replacement effort, hiring six additional recommended positions in Fiscal 2025 to shore up program management. Lastly, a revised risk register – with full contingency plans and responsibilities – is set for completion by March 31.

In modern project management, leaders use a centralized document, the “risk register,” to identify, assess, and track potential risks, quantifying their potential effects and ensuring that there is a clear accountability for a team member to “own” a particular problem.

Although Amtrak largely agreed with OIG about risks and challenges, Amtrak told OIG that its statement that Amtrak’s efforts to reduce design complexity delayed procurement by seven months, while true, gave short shrift to the full complexity of the procurement process and to Amtrak’s revisions.

“While the company revised several requirements based on feedback from car builders to address their comments and concerns, these revisions were not limited solely to design complexity,” wrote Amtrak’s Executive VP for Capital Delivery, Laura Mason. “Rather, they encompassed broader adjustments to the overall procurement strategy to drive a competitive process (e.g. terms and conditions, pricing, service agreement, etc.). The revisions were deliberate effort to ensure a robust and equitable procurement approach, balancing industry input and program needs.”

Amtrak also suggested that OIG oversimplified the responses Amtrak got to the Request for Information.

“It is crucial to avoid overgeneralizing the capabilities of a single car builder as indicative of the broader industry landscape,” Mason wrote. “The RFI question specifically asked how many different car types could be built simultaneously in a manufacturing facility without significantly impacting production. Responses varied: two car builders stated there were no defined limits, one specified the ability to produce up to six car types, and one did not provide a quantified limit/range. This variation highlights the diverse capabilities within the industry, providing a more comprehensive and balanced perspective on the responses received.”